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.Possible Trade Policy Consequences
of the Canadian Foreign Investment
Policy
Robert E. Hudec*
-I woulct like to address myself briefly to some of the implica-
tions which I see in the Canadian proposals about direct foreign
investment.' I believe there are issues here which relate to trade
liberalization in general, and also to the sectoral approach on the
Canadian Auto Parts model that we are charged to discuss this
afternoon.
I should begin by drawing around my remarks the protective
cloak of academia. I am not sure that what I have to say is going to
be an accurate description of the specific Canadian policy, or of the
reasons for this new Canadian policy; nor is it by any stretch of the
imagination an authoritative forecast of what is going to happen as
a result of that policy. I see in this new Canadian policy some ele-
ments of a larger trend. I would like to explore some of the pos-
sible reasons for that larger trend, and some of the consequences
likely to follow from it.
I would like to start with the hypothesis that efforts to regulate
foreign investment - of the kind being proposed by the Canadian
government - are very probably the wave of the future.
A key element behind the proliferation of these regulatory en-
deavors is a growing consensus that the behavior of the foreign
investor (primarily but not entirely the multinational enterprise)
tends to differ from the behavior of a local producer. The behavior
of the foreign investor, the consensus seems to say, produces a worse
cost-benefit balance to the host country. Why? The conclusions
appear to be the following: Foreign investors are less inclined to do
local sourcing because they tend to draw upon home establishments
for components, regardless of possible cost advantages of sourcing
locally. They will tend to be less aggressive exporters, because they
have arranged their export .markets to be served by various other
parts of the multinational enterprise, again regardless of possible
cost advantages of exporting local production. Finally, they tend
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1 The Canadian proposals are discussed in the remarks of Mr. Roberto Gualtieri.
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to generate fewer collateral economic benefits in areas such as re-
search and development, management training, development of en-
trepreneurial skills and so forth.'
There are two factors which are often cited to explain this sup-
posed behavioral deviation. The most common is the alleged ten-
dency of the foreign investor to be motivated by what is called an
ethno-centric point of viewv - the tendency to keep as much of its
operations in the home country as is possible. I am not sure why
ethno-centricity is always attributed to foreign investors. One sup-
poses that some of the difference between the behavior of foreign
and domestic investors might just as easily - indeed, more easily
- be the product of the ethno-centricity of the domestic investors.3
But that really makes no difference.. Either way, the host country
winds up with less economic benefit coming from a foreign inves-
tor.
The second reason for the supposed difference in behavior is com-
plimentary. It is that the multinational enterprise has risen above,
or is capable of rising above, considerations of comparative advan-
tage. Most factors of production have become extremely mobile,
and large multinational enterprises have the capacity to move these
factors of production relatively cheaply. Consequently, much of
what the multinational enterprise does can be done just about as
efficiently in one country as in another. If that is so, of course, de-
cisions about where to produce will necessarily be made on the basis
of considerations other than efficiency. 4 This conclusion both rein-
forces the conviction that the behavior of foreign investors will be
tilted unfavorably to the host country and, equally important, pro-
vides an economic justification for the host country asking for more
beneficial local activity.
These hypotheses enjoy a high degree of acceptability, and they
are being acted upon. 'Governments around the world have begun
2The Gray Report may be the most candid official (or semi-official) exposition of
this theme. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GRAY REPORT, 49-62 (CANADIAN FORUM
1971).
3 The hypothesis would be that, as compared with purely local enterprises, the multi-
national firm is much more likely to have had its ethno-centricity diluted by the added
perspective gained from a world-wide mode of operation.
4 This assumption commonly parades under the more general complaints about the
awesome economic power of the multinational giants, but it has been articulated by
Professor Behrman. See Behrman, International Sectoral Integration, An Alternative
to Free Trade, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 269, 282 (1972). A variant of the argument is
that pure efficiency considerations will be obliterated in any event by the investment
subsidy policies of other governments, so that even the purely rational firm will not be
making efficiency choices.
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to regulate the inflow of direct foreign investment for the purpose of
maximizing the cost-benefit balance received from that foreign in-
vestment. Once governments begin such regulation it is a little like
tasting blood. The regulation seems to work. One can see a cer-
tain amount of admiration in government documents (and I think
the Gray report is one of them) for the success that governments
like Japan have had in managing the inflow of foreign invest-
ment.5  More than just admiration, the documents also exhibit a
serious concern about being left behind. If governments like Japan
are getting more out of the multinational enterprise than the multi-
national enterprise is normally willing to give, that means that
less is being done in some other country - typically a country like
Canada which up to now has not been trying to exert counter-bar-
gaining pressures.6 There is a growing feeling that you either play
the game or get left quite far behind.
What does all this have to do with trade? I think Canada may
be an advanced example now of where these two seams come to-
-gether. Accept, for a moment, the hypothesis about the behavior of
the foreign investor. Then, take as a given that somewhere around
50% of Canadian manufacturing is controlled by non-residents, and
increase that figure substantially in certain key sectors.7 Adding the
two together, you might begin to ask whether trade liberalization
will really produce the results one normally expects in these foreign-
dominated sectors, -m i.e., that your local efficient firms will ag-
gressively pursue the new export opportunities created for them by
the reciprocal trade concessions you have negotiated. It may, of
course, happen that with removal of the trade barrier the foreign
investor will rationalize his production, as has happened, at least in
form, with regard to the Canadian Auto Parts agreement. On the
other hand, removing the trade barrier may give vent to all of those
dark forces that one suspects really motivate the foreign-investor,
namely, the desire to return "home" and to service his Canadian
market with homemade exports now that the tariff barriers are down.
If we look at the behavior of the automobile companies under
the Canadian Auto Parts agreement, 8 we see conflicting evidence
5 A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GRAY REPORT, supra note 2, 109-18.
6 I dat 57.
7/UNITED STATES INTERNA-iONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INDEPENDENT
WORLD, Report to the President, submitted by the Commission on International Trade
and Investment Policy, July, 1971, at 230. (U.S.G.P.O. No. 0-438-834).
8Agreement Concerning Automotive Products with the Government of Canada,
Jan. 16, 1965, (19661 1 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093.
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with regard to this question. There has been a substantial amount
of investment and rationalization in Canada. One conventional
expanation is that, although the automobile companies were forced
by the letters of understanding to guarantee a certain amount of in-
creased investment, the companies discovered much to their surprise
that it was actually efficient to be investing in Canada, and so they
did even more than was required.' This interpretation would, I
suppose, support a fairly optimistic forecast of what would happen
when you tear down trade barriers in an industry largely foreign-
controlled.
But on the other hand, one also finds testimony such as that given
by a representative of General Motors to the Williams Commis-
sion.10 Seeking to explain the adverse balance of payments impact
of the automotive products trade, the G.M. representative reported
that, in large part, the reason for the trade deficit was an inaccurate
forecast by the automobile manufacturers. The manufacturers had
hoped, he said, to keep Canadian production about equal with Ca-
nadian consumption; the reason for the deficit was that, although
Canadian consumption of automotive products did move as fore-
casted, the consumption of American-type automobiles did not, due
to a larger-than-expected import penetration of small third-country
automobiles.
If you think about that testimony for a while, you might come to
a different conclusion about the principles which guided the level
of investment in Canada. Was it-an efficiency decision? The testi-
mony seems to suggest no, that investment decisions were guided,
at least in terms of total size, by the desire to accommodate a po-
litical situation.
If one listens more generally to the debate which goes on in
the United States between the Congress, on the one hand, and the
multinational enterprises, on the other, one finds some other evi-
dence that may be of concern. Some members of Congress are
charging the multinational enterprises with running to low-cost for-
9 See Trezise, US.-Canadian Economic Relations, in UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 7, PAPERS,
vol. II, 217, 224-27.
10 Welch, U.S.-Canada Automotive Trade Agreement, in UNITED STATES INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, 239, 247-51. This
description of company investment and production policy does not, of course, serve as
any evidence of what would happen if both the Canadian and U.S. governments had
kept their hands off.
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eign sources in order to export back to the United States." Now if
that charge were true, it would indicate, I suppose, that the multi-
national enterprises were indeed behaving in an economically ra-
tional fashion. When the firms reply to the Congress, however,
they seem to be saying that the investments abroad are not nearly so
rational. We invest abroad, they say, only when we have to in
order to save the market; we prefer producing in the United States
unless it is really a question of losing the market. Moreover, they
add, when we do invest abroad, we generate lots of exports that we
would not otherwise have.12  The suggestion of this latter point is
that captive foreign subsidiaries will buy from the parent, whereas
local firms probably would not.
A Canadian listening to that testimony would have to be rather
concerned about the economic motivation of the multinational en-
terprise. One has to take this testimony, of course, with a grain of
salt. The multinational enterprises are caught in a political cross-
fire. Each government wants a trade surplus. That is a rather dif-
ficult objective to achieve, across the board. The multinational en-
terprise is doing the logical thing with these illogical demands. It
is promising every government a surplus. As I say, one has to take
these promises with a grain of salt.
Nonetheless, the fear of noneconomic business decisions is real,
and the fear leads logically to the conclusion that one cannot ap-
proach trade barrier reduction, at least in foreign-dominated sec-
tors, without concern for the subsequent behavior of the foreign
investors who are there. That concern, in turn, may well lead gov-
ernments to make trade liberalization contingent on "understand-
ings" concerning the subsequent behavior of foreign investors. I
am saying, in other words, that the possibility of governments de-
manding such understandings may be a far more common problem
than we have thus far assumed in our thinking about the Canadian
Auto Parts agreement.
Now the question I would put is this: Assume that what I have
said so far is right. On what basis are governments going to talk
to each other when it comes to the question of regulating, accom-
11 This point of view has been represented in the main by the support given to the
so-called Burke-Hartke bill which has been before the Congress for the past several
years, thus far without success. The bill proposes to limit foreign investment generally
by means of both less favorable tax treatment and direct regulation. See, e.g., H.R.
10914, 92d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) Titles I, VI.
12 See, e.g., EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN TRADE (ECAT), THE ROLE
OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD ECON-
OMIES, 14-27 (1972).
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modating, coordinating and reaching agreement on the legitimacy
of each other's demands on the behavior of foreign investors?
What is an appropriate demand for the government to make?
Although my sources of information are about fourth hand by
now, a typical problem seems to have arisen under the Canadian
Auto Parts agreement. The United States officials are now taking
the position that the letters of understanding were transitional and
transitional only, and that the ultimate objective in the North Amer-
ican automotive production field should be to let market forces de-
termine where production is sited. I take it that the Canadian gov-
ernment is not completely committed to that view. There is at
least some mention of a continuing commitment on the part of the
automobile companies to keep their production in Canada roughly
correspondent to the Canadian percentage of automobile consump-
tion."3  This is the kind of problem I see. How are we going to
approach it?
Looking at the positions emanating from various United States
government sources, one will see a certain degree of uncertainty
among ourselves about the demands we want to make on this pro-
cess. In the report of the President's Commission on International
Trade and Investment Policy (the Williams Report), some inter-
esting comparisons can be made. There is a very strong denuncia-
tion of Japanese policy toward investment; Japan must open up. 4
There also is another general section in which the Commission rec-
ommends that the United States, as a matter of general policy, try
to amplify and strengthen the commitments of tlic OECD Code of
Capital Liberalization,' 5 a code which essentially aims toward a free
market for foreign investment. But then, in the section devoted to
United States policy toward developing countries, the Commission
recognizes that each country has a "sovereign right" to determine
when and what direct foreign investment is consistent with its na-
tional goals. "' The difference between the policies toward devel-
oped and developing countries is never ... well, developed. I am
not saying that these policies are necessarily inconsistent. One can
think of many possible distinctions. But the question is not discussed.
Emanating from the legislative branch of government we have
13 See Trezise, supra note 9, at 225-26.
14 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD, supra note 7, at 221-23.
15 Id. at 193-95.
1Old. at 255.
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the Burke-Hartke bill.' 7 Now the Burke-Hartke bill does not rest
on any concern about the noneconomic behavior of foreign investors.
Quite to the contrary, it assumes that foreign investors behave with
complete economic rationality. But even so, Burke-Hartke is as-
serting a competing claim - that the United States should also have
a hand in determining what investment goes out of the country. If
you think about it, Burke-Hartke is really a logical response to what
is going on in the rest of the world. If governments around the
world continue to exert stronger and stronger controls over what
foreign investment comes in and how it must behave, one cannot
expect the United States to stand aside while others decide where
an industry's economic activity shall be located. At some point,
the United States will have to assert its own interests in the invest-
ment outflow.
The variety of positions appearing within the United States is
typical of the unsettled nature of the problem generally. The ques-
tion remains: On what basis are we going to talk to each other?
One solution is that there are no rational, neutral standards such as
the free market place to which we can appeal, and that what we
must do instead is to.accept the fact that this is simply a question of
cutting up the pie of economic benefits. Under this view, we should
treat the problem much as we treat some of the cooperative pro-
curement arrangements that we make under NATO, where, when
NATO forces build a fighter plane, everybody gets a piece.18
Another solution, the one which government officials would think
of first, is to call a conference and try to create a GATT for invest-
ment. Indeed that title is now quite well known, at least in aca-
demic circles. 9 One of the difficulties with this approach (though
certainly not a bar) is that if one looks at the conventional sources
of what might be called the common law on this subject, we really
have not moved very far toward consensus. The conventional in-
ternational events and documents have a strange disharmony with
actual practice. We have the United States pursuing very aggres-
sively a free market policy in its treaties of friendship, commerce
17 See note 11 supra.
18 Professor Behrman has given thoughtful consideration to this approach, and to its
utility as a means for industrial development and integration. See Behrman, supra
note 4; Behrman, Sharing International Production Through the Multinational Enter-
prise and Sectoral Integration, 4 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L BUSINESS 1 (1972).
19 See, e.g., Kindleberger & Goldberg, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal
for Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L BUSINESS
295 (1970).
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and navigation. 0 Indeed we have treaty commitments with many
of the countries who are regulating foreign investment, treaties in
which those countries are promising not to regulate investment.21
We have the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements,
mentioned above, which has been the apex of this free market effort.
Here we are, then, moving toward a more and more formal declar-
ative consensus in favor of the free market place, while at the same
time governments are increasingly turning toward greater regula-
tion in fact. If we were to call a conference, I do not think we
would have very much with which to start.
I leave you with the question, where do we go? I think this is
a question which, while it now comes up with regard to Canada,
is probably one that is going to influence more and more trade nego-
tiations generally, the more that foreign investment occupies sectors
of various industries around the world. Canada faces the problem
in acute form. But think for a moment how many other countries
have already permitted a substantial degree of foreign investment
penetration.
20 See generally, Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958).
21 See, e.g., Torem & Craig, Control of Foreign Investment in France, 66 MICH, L.
REV. 669, 706 (1968).
